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Introduction
Institutions are the rules of the game that help to shape the long-term historical development of societies. They mediate human interaction and can be more or less formal (or tangible) in nature ranging from systems of government to common modes of behaviour. Most formal institutions can be distinguished as economic, social, political or cultural in nature although such distinctions are more difficult to make for informal institutions. What is certain is the pervasive impact of all types of institutions on a country's multifaceted development. Thus, economic performance may be shaped as much by a nation's legal system as by its trade policy.
In this chapter we sketch the origins and development of institutions that have had a significant bearing upon innovation as one of the mainstays of the economic growth of Australia since White Settlement two centuries ago. Most existing studies of relevant Australian institutions have focused on the period since Federation, and little attempt has been made to analyse the institutions-economic development relationship.
1 Our description of institutions and analysis of their bearing upon economic progress is underpinned by the new institutionalism, particularly that of Douglass North. North's contribution is most striking in his rejection of rational choice models and so-called efficiency theory: for him, a society's set of institutions evolve through a wide range of influences or ideologies, which rarely provide for an optimal economic outcome.
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Institutions and economic change
North developed a dynamic theory of institutional change composed of three elements: informal 'constraints', formal 'constraints' and enforcement mechanisms.
Both formal and informal institutions play a 'constraining' role in the sense that they bring some order to the chaos of human interactions. Informal constraints include norms of behaviour, conventions and codes of conduct. They are embodied in the belief systems, cultures and ideologies of a society that evolve gradually over long periods of time and have the ability to endure through major historical events. A continuum exists from informal to formal constraints, with the latter including the law, systems of government, public policy and economic markets. These can alter markedly over shorter time periods in response to major events and changes in the dominant actors.
More specifically, in the economic sphere institutions bring order to production and exchange, and it is their effect on the cost of exchange and production that largely explains their influence on economic performance. Thus, for example, a well-defined and respected system of property rights will encourage cost-reducing innovation by protecting the value of the rents associated with new ideas. Particular codes of conduct will be conducive to low transaction costs, thereby making exchange more efficient.
While the effect of institutions generally is to reduce uncertainty in human interaction, this does not inevitably provide the most efficient economic outcomes.
North noted three reasons why suboptimality often results: our limited understanding of our own reality and how it changes over time; our imperfect belief systems; and our blunt tools for implementing change and development. As a result, North rather depressingly concluded: 'Economic history is an endless depressing tale of miscalculation leading to famine, starvation, deceit and warfare, death, economic stagnation and decline, and indeed the disappearance of whole civilizations' (North, 1999: 18) . In this light, the economic enrichment of 'Western' nations over the last two centuries can be viewed as the exception rather than the rule, since most societies have failed to establish the institutional structure necessary for sustainable economic modernization.
Western exceptionalism is explained by North through adaptive efficiency:
'the ability of some societies to adjust flexibly in the face of shock and evolve institutions that effectively deal with altered reality' (North, 1999:18) . Stable but unchanging institutions do not provide the impetus for economic growth. 3 Rosenberg and Birdzell emphasize the role of institutional change in their explanation of 'How the West Grew Rich' (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986) . They cite nine institutional innovations favourable to economic development in Western Europe by the eighteenth century, which cover a range of broad or specific legal, financial, religious and political contexts. These are: the legal enforcement of contracts and property claims; the evolution of bills of exchange and modern banking systems; insurance; the replacement of arbitrary confiscation with regular taxation and recognized property rights; economic association without kinship; double-entry bookkeeping; religious and moral systems conducive to commercial activity; the mercantilist partnership; and political fragmentation in Europe. (North, 1981) . The result was the evolution of a legitimate legal structure (including mercantile law), the growth of science and technology, and the development of military technology that facilitated European hegemony (North, 1993: 17) .
In practice, this was merely the occasion of major institutional change, which was brought to a head by a much longer period of incremental adjustment in informal institutions or value systems conducive to modern systems of exchange and production. North accounts for institutional change by a process of interaction between organizations (the players) and institutions (rules and conduct). In particular, competition among organizations is important to encourage their investment in new skills and knowledge, which in turn will shape future perceptions and belief systems. With a paucity of formal institutions, of particular interest for the early years of settlement are the informal institutions represented in belief systems and codes of conduct brought to Australia by British migrants. On the one hand, the fact that many were convicted criminals suggests that the levels of trust and credible commitment required in economic transactions may have been in short supply. Against this, it must be borne in mind that many were convicted of petty offences, often the result of desperation from abject poverty. It is doubtful that most of these convicts were part of a hardened criminal class (Nicholas, 1990; Shlomovitz, 1990) . Moreover, some brought with them business experience, entrepreneurial values and trade skills (Oxley, 1996) . Many came from close-knit working-class and ethnic communities, particularly in East London, where a strong emphasis was placed upon trustworthy behaviour within their group. 5 Significantly, early forms of enterprise in Australia largely took the form of personal exchange, relying upon repeated dealing among small local firms as a basis for honest behaviour. Kinship and social networks added to the sense of trust (Ville, 1998 Putnam. Analyses of European medieval guilds, however, suggest they were also capable of generating divisiveness and exclusivity (Putnam, 2000; Ogilvie, 2003) .
While social capital carries notions of a cooperative community spirit, other writers have identified individualism as the predominant British belief system, resonating strongly with an entrepreneurial and inventive ethos. It has been widely argued that Britain made a transition from a peasant society to an individualistic and commercial one in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, although Macfarlane controversially argued for a much earlier genesis of English individualism.
8
After about 1800, the arrival of more 'free' immigrants to Australia, many of whom were merchants from British and Indian houses, the increasing numbers of emancipated convicts ('emancipists') and a change in official attitudes towards them from Macquarie's governship, and pressure from London for financial self-sufficiency in the colonies, provided new opportunities for economic activity beyond the jail and out of the control of the New South Wales Corps. By the time of Commissioner Bigge's 1821 reports into the colonies, many of his recommendations were already under way including the preferred assignment of convicts to private employers and the encouragement of private investors. As Butlin has noted, a mixed economy began to take shape after 1810, comprising a conventional public sector alongside a rapidly growing private sector (Butlin, 1994: 3) .
Nonetheless, for most of the nineteenth century, economic expansion 
Local adaption of colonial institutions
British institutions, nonetheless, were tempered by an environment for which they were not designed. As a result, institutions evolved as they adapted to local Australian conditions, while still remaining fundamentally British and colonial.
Environmental differences centred around location, climate and factor costs.
Australia's location in the south Pacific made it the antipodes of Britain and remote from the regions of major human settlement and modern economic progress, the socalled 'tyranny of distance' thesis (Blainey, 2001) . Its hot, dry climate contrasted with Britain's mild and wet one. Australia's land abundancy but labour deficiency was similarly the converse of the small but populous British Isles.
These environmental differences helped to shape the evolution of Australian belief systems in the nineteenth century, or what North calls 'mental models'. The issue of distance was not just that with the rest of the world: communications among a colony's rural settlements and, intercolonially, between the major centres of Sydney and Melbourne, was slow and unreliable. The sense of isolation of small communities added to the great uncertainty of small-scale farming in a hot, dry climate and helped to develop a strongly supportive frame of mind. With few alternative distractions and the need to share knowledge, assets, skills and experiences, communities were thrown together in a plethora of local organizations of a strongly inclusive and socially interactive nature: social and sporting clubs, charity groups, religious gatherings, agricultural and horticultural societies and farmers clubs were all to be found in most pastoral and farming districts of south-eastern Australia by the late 1850s. While this sense of community was akin to the experiences of British rural life, the additional factors of extreme isolation, limited social hierarchies and class symbols, convictism, and a predominantly male population at first, generated a greater sense of equality and mutual help as reflected in high levels of social capital and the idea of mateship.
While the church was an important institution of colonial Australian communities, the accompanying religion was more rational and secularist than in Britain, sometimes referred to as civil religion. This has been attributed to the use of religion as an ethics system in the early penal colony and the adoption of a practical and 'here-and-now' approach to life in the face of great hardships on the frontier and a strong sense of uncertainty. This took precedence over esoteric ideology and personal sacrifice for a hereafter life that could not easily be verified (Gillman, 1999: 239-42). Religious interdenominationalism was rarely a source of conflict in contrast to European experience. Relations between Catholics and Protestants in rural Australia, for example, were generally 'harmonious and cooperative', helped by nonextreme forms of doctrinal interpretation if not a degree of irreligiosity (Logan, 2000: 121; Swan, 1970; Jackson, 1987; Campbell, 1997) .
By mid-century, cooperative behaviour was furthered by a relatively homogeneous group of settlers, educated and of medium-to-high social rank. They frequently came from the same region of Britain, shared similar cultural values and religious beliefs, and included large extended-family groupings. 9 Scots, with their strong emphasis upon family and clan, were numerous. Former military officers and employees of the East India Company were also common (James, 1949: 63; Roberts, 1935: 368-75) . The arrival of non-British migrants rarely engendered distrust and social dislocation. Outside the highly itinerant goldfields, European-Chinese relations were generally characterized by 'mutual cooperation and benefit'. Lancashire has noted the support of rural institutions such as the judiciary, local press and large landowners for their Chinese communities against prejudicial legislation emanating from urban central government, which may suggest some tension between local and British influences upon institutional development (Lancashire, 2000: 229, 237-8) .
The adaptiveness of colonial Australia's institutions is perhaps best illustrated by the Victorian gold mining boom of the 1850s. The discovery of gold in July 1851
led to a rapid influx of diggers, with the population of the Victorian goldfields rising from 19,000 to 144,000, 1851-60. Most of the prospecting occurred on public land and, with additional concerns over social stability, the Victorian government introduced a system of property rights to govern mining, which included a licence fee and a defined size of claim. These rules proved defective in terms of incentives and were difficult to enforce, which, when combined with rapid changes in the technology and geology of mining, contributed to the unrest that culminated in the Eureka
Stockade rebellion of 1854. Whilst suppressing the rebellion with armed force, the Victorian government took note of the complaints and instituted major institutional reforms in the mining communities. These reforms provided more effective allocation of property rights and political representation, which secured social stability and more effective resource exploitation (La Croix, 1992) .
Two environmental forces shaping the growth of formal as well as informal institutional structures before 1900 were distance and population size. Distance and poor communication between the colonies emphasized the sense of independence and with it the development of separate and distinctive institutional structures. The legacy of this has been fragmented and, arguably, therefore inefficient institutions creating a framework of federated nationhood, sustained by the particularism of individual states. Distance, combined with small population bases, has necessitated governments to champion the construction of expensive infrastructure, using their resources and taxing capability to raise funds for the purpose on the London Stock Exchange. This 'colonial socialism' has also generated a legacy of interventionism for twentiethcentury Australia (Butlin, 1959) .
Both firms and markets were British-dominated in the nineteenth century. The Australian economy was heavily oriented towards the export of primary products, most notably wool, meat, dairy products, grain and gold. The main market for each of these products was in London, not Sydney or Melbourne. Wool was sold by auction at the London coffee houses before moving to a separate Wool Exchange in 1875 (Maughan, 1931: 73) . In mid-century about 80 per cent of Australian wool was thus sold (Barnard, 1958: 47) . Australian wool growers had to wait months to receive the proceeds of a sale in a distant market about which they understood little and from which price trend and other commercial information were slow to emerge.
Sales were controlled by British consignors and brokers such as Dalgety and
Australian Mercantile Land and Finance Company, and it was London firms in ancillary and related industries that benefited from the location of the market.
Financial markets were equally dependent upon London with the London Stock Exchange providing far greater levels of funding for the Australian colonial economies than the embryonic local exchanges, which dealt in a small number of mostly thinly traded scripts (Hall, 1963; Hall, 1968; Salsbury and Sweeney, 1988) .
British banks were also major providers of firm finance as were a wide range of British firms across many industries through personal networks and ongoing trading relationships. 10 The 1830s witnessed the establishment of British banks in Australia, notably the Bank of Australasia, the Union Bank and the Bank of South Australia, which were larger branch institutions channelling British investment and providing related services such as foreign exchange. Adapting to the needs of the Australian economy, many banks broke with British orthodoxy by lending on the collateral of landed property, livestock and other relatively illiquid securities (Merrett, 1997: 184) .
Banks and wool consignors are two important examples of a specific type of British multinational that was widely represented in nineteenth-century Australia: the free-standing company (Wilkins, 1988) . Frequently, their domestic operations in
Britain physically amounted to little more than a nameplate over a door in the City of London although, within the context of mid-nineteenth-century Australia, they were both very large and highly specialized. As late as 1910 seven of the leading ten companies operating in Australia were of this type (Ville and Merrett, 2000) . The intention behind these companies was to secure natural resources and farming output needed by the industrializing British economy, although the benefits to the complementary Australian economy were also substantial, particularly in terms of inflows of entrepreneurship, knowledge, finance and technology and the outflow of pastoral and mining exports. In the first half of the century the first two benefits were of little value to small private businesses while the third, limited liability, was regarded with suspicion particularly in the eyes of creditors. There were only about 71 incorporations in New South
Wales, 1835-51, and 14 in Melbourne by 1852. Such companies were concentrated in a few capital-intensive industries such as transport and utilities, were floated in cyclical booms by a small number of promoters, and had high failure rates (Salsbury and Sweeney, 1988: 6-7; Hall, 1968: 3) . (Ville, 2005: 76) . During the First World War, Britain was able to acquire the whole of the Australian wool clip for its wartime needs under the Imperial Wool Purchase Scheme but this was under circumstances of tough Australian negotiations that resulted in highly beneficial terms for the Australian grower, as Tsokhas has shown (Tsokhas, 1990) .
While repatriation of the wool market was largely the product of economic imperatives and the actions of wool brokers, changes in other primary produce markets were more closely associated with government action in response to economic uncertainty in evolving produce markets, resulting from war and depression. These included marketing boards, price support, and international commodity agreements. Kenwood has noted: 'The involvement of some ten federal and more than fifty state statutory marketing authorities . . . has thus been the most prominent feature of Australian agricultural marketing since the 1920s' (Kenwood, 1995: 51) . Operating over a wide range of commodities, the Boards had broad responsibilities, particularly price support, product promotion, and capital and technical assistance. As single desk authorities, they played a key part in the price stabilization ('home consumption pricing') policies of successive governments, which fixed home prices artificially high and stable on the justification of a wage-cost disadvantage. A logical third string to agricultural support was the negotiation of international commodity agreements to mitigate price fluctuations in overseas markets. Most agreements, however, were relatively short-lived with only marginal effects on prices (Kenwood, 1995: 53) . used national defence reasons to justify further increases, taking the range of dutiable imports to 71 per cent (Kenwood, 1995: 69-70) . Import quotas were also periodically introduced. Variations in protection levels were used to prosecute development policies; for example, preferential rates were used to foster a local automobile industry at the end of the Second World War (Conlon and Perkins, 2001: 115-16 ).
While multinationals continued to play an important role in twentieth-century Australia, the dominance of British-registered free-standing companies diminished.
Of the top 25 non-financial firms domiciled in Australia in 1910, 12 were foreignregistered (all British). By 1930 this figure had declined to eight and then to three by 1952. Firms registered in New South Wales or Victoria began to take their place (Ville and Merrett, 2000) . Where British multinationals remained in Australia, they faced tensions between the rights of local management and their London boards.
Helped by improved communications, those firms willing to delegate substantial responsibilities to local management often gained a consequential competitive advantage. Among the major wool brokers, the slowness of the London boards of NZLMA and AMLF to relinquish tight control was reflected in their loss of market share in the first half of the twentieth century (Ville, 2000) . Benefiting from early incumbency and tariff protection, many leading Australian firms began to expand nationally in the first half of the twentieth century.
British free-standing companies were largely superseded by American multinationals that located manufacturing subsidiaries in Australia. They provided much of the technological and organizational know-how underpinning the industrial diversification of Australia, which provided a quid pro quo for the tariff protection sought by such firms.
Globalizing institutions: convergent efficiency
Declining competitiveness and fragmented federalism
The substitution of local institutions more akin to, and providing greater control over, Australia's twentieth-century development was a major step forward. It helped to provide the foundations for rapid economic growth and modernization, and appeared to be based upon a high degree of consensus and egalitarian behaviour led by actors who viewed themselves increasingly as Australian rather than AngloAustralian or British. Nonetheless, it was a 'White' Australian consciousness in which other racial groups were disadvantageously treated. Economically, it was limited in its ability to promote sustainable competitive advantages. Two factors largely explain its economic shortcomings: the creation of a high-cost, high-price economy and the failure to complete the national integration of political and economic institutions.
Protectionism and labour market regulation, while designed to diversify the economy and foster industrial harmony through justice, were primarily responsible for a cost-price structure that was not internationally competitive and reduced domestic consumer demand. Tariffs raised domestic production costs and, by mitigating foreign competition, sustained small firms and industries that were probably not competitive beyond an infant industry period, thus limiting resource reallocation to more promising long-term growth sectors and firms. Moreover, they encouraged competition-shy firms, including powerful multinationals attracted by the external tariff, to invest in rent-seeking political lobbying activity to maintain or even raise protection, rather than focus upon increased operational efficiencies particularly through innovation. 12 Centralized wage determination, by largely ignoring economic imperatives such as skill and product differences, fostered labour markets relatively unresponsive to the needs of structural change. Finally, 'human protectionism', in other words the 'White Australia' immigration policy, shut out sources of productive low-wage workers (Brennan and Pincus, 2002: 64) . However, Australia's is a fragmented federalism, where differences exist between the individual state constitutions, thus adding considerably to the complexity of federalstate government relations and, indeed, state-state government relations (Costar, 1999) . The incomplete constitutional transformation is also seen by Olson as allowing institutional sclerosis to take hold in Australia and with it the capture of government policy by interest groups (Olson, 1984; Marks and Sadeghi, 1998 Deregulation and engagement A decisive change of direction occurred from the 1970s and 1980s and, as at the beginning of the century, it was driven by changing belief systems at home and a shifting external environment. Australia's nationalist economic policies had achieved rapid economic growth but with the slowdown of global growth in the 1970s, more attention was focused on boosting efficiency and competitiveness. As we saw above, Australia's high cost structure, rent-seeking political economy and fragmented federalism had contributed to declining international competitiveness. Much blame was attached to the cosy consensus that provided powerful rent-seeking corporations protection from competition by trade barriers and price regulation in return for high wages for labour unrelated to levels of productivity.
The break with that conventional wisdom was as decisive and as widely Meredith and Dyster, 1999: 328) . Various industrial incentives were offered, partly as a quid pro quo, to ease the transition to free trade, and as part of a change of focus towards the pursuit of efficiency and environmental responsibility. The stated intentions were the promotion of investment, exports, innovation, competitiveness and resource sustainability (Brennan & Pincus, 2002: 75) . In financial markets, foreign exchange controls were ended, the dollar was allowed to 'float', foreign banks were permitted to apply for licences to operate in Australia, and most remaining barriers between domestic and international financial markers were removed (Merrett, 1998) .
Labour market decentralization reduced the powers of federal arbitration tribunals and encouraged a focus upon enterprise-level negotiations and awards. This had the effect of reducing the role of central awards to a safety net for the low paid (Castles, 2002: 48-9) . Labour skills were enhanced by the substantial expansion of participation in tertiary education as a result of elevating many educational institutions (CAEs) into universities and introducing a partial user-pay funding system (HECS) that could handle the vast increase in expenditure. In addition, greater attention was given to the fostering of skills that addressed employment needs (Cowie, 1999) .
While shifts in the institutional structure governing labour, capital and trade largely involved loosening the reins of government control, competition policy headed in the opposite direction. The absence of effective competition policy until the final third of the twentieth century contributed to the uncompetitive business environment, allowing interfirm collusion to flourish. Butlin, Barnard and Pincus aptly summarized the situation: 'all the restrictive practices known to man were exploited in the Australian economy' (Butlin, Barnard, and Pincus, 1982: 125 Since 1993 the structuralist approach of dominance has been largely replaced by a behavioural or conduct test of competition, The Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission was created in 1995 with wide-ranging powers and coverage, and employs economic ideas and concepts to evaluate levels of competition (King, 2003) . Competition has additionally been enhanced by removing the industry monopolies of government enterprises at both federal and state levels, by privatization, the admission of competing firms, or contracting out the right to provide particular services (Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, December 1997) .
Associated with these shifting institutional patterns, particularly enhanced competition and domestic market maturity, has been the demise of the distinctive proprietary capitalism of early twentieth-century Australia and its replacement with more modern corporate forms, based on stronger organizational structures and more effective corporate strategies, which converge to a large degree with advanced forms of capitalism in other developed nations and have led large numbers of firms to reverse the institutional legacy by expanding overseas (Fleming, Merrett and Ville, 2004: 203) .
Institutional change and innovation
One of the key drivers of a nation's nature and pace of economic development is innovation, particularly through the development of cost-reducing processes and the introduction of new products and services. Thus, a consequential issue arising from our broad survey of institutions and economic development in Australia is the impact the changing institutional structure has had upon the nature and rate of innovation.
Secondly, generalizing about the institutional legacy from historical experience, we investigate the extent to which a distinctive national innovation system has evolved.
Imported British colonial institutions of the nineteenth century provided strong social, knowledge, financial and legal foundations for innovation. Thus, for example, the system of patents together with secure property rights helped to protect the value of rents associated with innovation. Well-founded networks provided the trust, Australia has provided greater opportunities to absorb and adapt effectively foreign sources of technology to suit the local environment as well as enhanced domestic research and development capabilities (Fleming, Merrett, and Ville, 2004: 227-9) .
Conclusion: towards a national innovation system
The adaptiveness of Australian institutions to profound environmental change over two centuries and the rapid establishment of impersonal markets suggest, overall, an institutional structure receptive to the opportunities presented by innovation. While much of this chapter has emphasized historical change in Australia's institutional structure, elements of continuity also exist -key patterns, moderated by historical experience. Such patterns or layers, by setting some distinctive ground rules, have helped to give shape and coherence to a multi-layered national framework for innovation at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These continuing facets include: surmounting the problems of geographical distance, small population size, and fragmented institutions, while harnessing the benefits of social cohesion, networking skills, a secularist state of mind, the influence of foreign direct investment, a richness of natural resources, the rule of law, and a mixed economy.
These continuities, combined with the periodic shifts discussed here, provide the distinctive institutional legacy for the generation and reception of knowledge flows in Australia and thus the shaping of a contemporary national innovation system that is currently a subject of much discussion and analysis (Mapping Australian Science and Innovation, 2003) .
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